The Positivist Historian’s Dilemma in Post-Liberation Korea

The Korean peninsula was ‘liberated’ following the defeat of Japan at the end of the Second World War. Military occupation and the division of occupied territory between the USA and Soviet Union was originally only put in place to secure the transition of Korea into a peninsula controlled by an international administration. The complex politics of the Cold War prevented this [1].

The developments of post-liberation politics were complicated by various political alliances and domestic issues, and so an American-backed colonial elite came back into power in the South. There was no clear break in political structure in the South in the pre- and post-liberation periods, so the “legacy of collaboration” remained a political issue [1]. Ceuster states that public opinion maintained that, “in order to secure a future for an independent Korean state, former collaborators had to be excluded from an active role in post-war politics.” [1]. However, no comprehensive attempt was made at defining who was actually a collaborator. Many Korean administration workers for the Japanese colonial government general remained in high positions by painting themselves as “crusaders against the communist threat.” [1]. Moreover, historical discourse on collaboration became complicated when political convictions interfered and steered historical research.

For positivist historians, who emphasised the objectivity of empirical research in history writing, the idea of having to apologise for their role during colonial occupation was problematic. The concept of writing a positivist history rested on the notion that the facts told the story, and that the story was inherently embedded in themselves as fact. No historian who submitted to rigorous research of the facts could produce an alternative narrative that was not already present in the historical sources themselves [2]. As long as a historian conformed to this scientific, empirical method, then the histories they wrote were ultimately objective.

Considering this, what then would positivist historians in Korea have to apologise for post-liberation? [2]. If they acknowledged their role in furthering Japanese historical narratives, such as toyoshi, then they would be admitting that their positivist histories were not as objective as they claimed. The idea of disavowing their previous work and engaging in a systematic critique of their positive historiographies, and the narrative strategies immanent within them, was not popular. This kind of critique would come later in South Korea, starting in 1961 and developing into historiographies on cultural history [2].

.

[1] Ceuster, Koen de, (2001) ‘The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea,’ Korean Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2. pp. 207-242

[2] Em, Henry H. (2013) The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea, Duke University Press, London and Durham

The “discovery of minjok”: a historical force or a modern construction?

If one dismisses the minjok, there is no history.” – Sin Ch’ae-ho

Korean ethnic nationalist historiography is based on the idea that the Korean people have existed as an ethnic group – minjok – throughout the entirety of history since around 2000 B.C. The idea of minjok developed primarily during the period of Japanese colonialization (1910-1945) among leading nationalist historians. It was a way to emphasise the uniqueness and superiority of the Korean people in the face of subordination from the Japanese. This sense of Korean ethnic (and cultural) superiority was reinforced by popular nationalist histories published mainly in the 1930s, including the works of Sin Ch’ae-ho and Choe Nam-son, as representative of the Korean people’s “spirit of survival and struggle.” [1]. Yet, the time at which minjok is said to have existed, or been introduced into intellectual thought, is a key source of debate and there are significant conceptual consequences depending on which argument you agree with.

The idea of the Korean people as a single ethnic race first entered Korean vocabulary in the late-1890s under the term minjok. The precise origins of the term are difficult to identify, but it appears only sporadically in various Korean nationalist texts in the ten years prior to the Protectorate Treaty of 1905. Prior to the 19th century, there was a very limited sense of loyalty towards the idea of Korea as an abstract ‘nation’ or towards ‘Koreans’ as a people [3]. The use of the two characters ‘min’ and ‘jok’ – which derived from terms associated with ‘popular’ and ‘familial’ – combined to produce a useful term that intellectuals could use to naturally refer to the nation in Korea. This also helped to blur the recent origins of the term, suggesting a much further reaching claim of nation stretching into the “distant past.” [2].

Andre Schmid notes that the important primary texts in the period 1895-1905 were all written without the use of minjok, despite all individually discussing nationalist concepts [2]. As the term became more commonly used in popular newspapers and writings of the early 20th century, such as in the Hwangson sinmun, its definitional boundaries became more concrete. In a four-part editorial published in June 1907 entitled ‘Minjok-ism’, the editors referred to the minjok as the basis of the state (kuk), and maintained that all of the people must “work together for the benefit of the minjok.” [4]. The term was vital in the determining of nationhood in Korea, acting as an objective entity which, when combined with the features of nation – territory, language, people etc. – presented an argument for the continued existence of Korean autonomy. Understandably, it became a key force in nationalist writings that stood in opposition to the common Japanese narrative of the Korean nation as subordinate. Thus, minjok developed as a key conceptual tool through which the nation could be considered, and therefore placing it either as a 20th century construction or as something that existed throughout the entirety of Korean history furthered different arguments about Korean national sovereignty, intertwining with the colonialist politics of the period.

Named the father of Korean nationalist historiography, Sin Ch’ae-ho was the first historian to combine the idea of minjok with the Korean national founding myth surrounding the figure Tan’gun. The earliest account of the myth of Tan’gun appears in the Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of Three Kingdoms), which was a collection of myths compiled by the Buddhist monk Iryon in the thirteenth century [5]. The story of Tan’gun recalls:

                “Tan’gun descended from Heaven in the year 2333 B.C. and landed under a sandalwood tree on Mount Paektu. According to this account, Tan’gun taught the people more than 360 arts, such as agriculture, medicine, and law, as well as offering them a new set of moral principles.” [5].

Sin took the myth of Tan’gun and aimed to separate its mythical elements from its historical actuality, tracing the Korean ethnic national origin, and by association Korean traditional culture, back to Tan’gun as a founding historical figure [6]. Sin’s writings are arguably more widely read now than during his lifetime, and the message behind his claims of minjok as an unconscious and perpetualconcept were deeply political and anti-Japanese. Sin concerned himself with issues of Korean identity in his writing of national histories, contributing towards the Korean self-strengthening movement [8].

Sin’s intrinsic claim concerning minjok was that its emergence into mainstream histories written at the beginning of the 20th century was not the product of a modern construction, but rather a discovery of an objective historical entity that had always been present amongst the Korean people. Regardless of whether Koreans were conscious of minjok as constituting their nation, Sin argues that its introduction signified a recognition of an objective unit that prior historians had failed to observe. It did not “signify a new conceptualisation” of what ‘nation’ meant in Korea but revealed an alternative axis on which empirical inquiry could be completed [9]. In presenting minjok as an ahistorical entity, Schmid states that it “transcended the very history that produced it.” [15]. Sin’s historical narrative based on this ‘discovery of minjok’ legitimises it as an eternal concept and was key to nationalist anti-colonial discourses of the 1920s and 1930s. Sin’s distinctive historiography set the agenda for later nationalist historiography during the colonial period, insisting on Korea’s uniqueness within world history and testifying to Korea’s long history of resistance to “foreign aggression.” [10].

Later criticisms of this aspect of nationalist historiography from Marxist historians such as Paek Nam-un argued that in emphasizing Korea’s uniqueness, and therefore it’s apparent inherent nationhood in resistance to colonialism, fed into the narrative that their isolation meant they needed to be incorporated into the wider nation-state system. This incorporation, Japan argued, should happen through their imperial framework [11]. Equally, the idea of Korea as a sovereign nation did not exist prior to its introduction to the international system [12]. This paradox within nationalist thought meant it had to continue to differentiate itself from colonialist discourses, and even as it writes about resistance and post-colonial developments it does so through the rational models of knowledge that came from colonialism. Thus, the narratives found in nationalist historiography and the narratives found in colonialist historiography served to mutually constitute one another.

However, Henry Em insists that minjok was a modern construction, and that it is important in examining later democratic developments in Korea, and how they relate to nationalist movements, to identify it as such [7]. A similar argument is furthered by Eugene Weber who states how the French peasant was “nationalised” – ie: made French – only in the latter decades of the 19th century through a strategy of standardisation of national language and customs [13]. Thus, the prevalence of modern state structures was a prerequisite to the formation of a ‘national’ culture. Em links the assertions of Sin’s nationalist historiography to new democratic modes of thought that imagined Korea as an autonomous subject with an inherent sovereignty present from the inception of Tan’gun, and with continuous possibilities into the future of Korea as an independent nation [14].

.

[1] Pai, Hyung Il, (2000) ‘The Formation of Korean Identity,’ in Constructing “Korean” Origins, Harvard University Asia Centre, p. 2

[2] Schmid, Andre (2002) ‘Narrating the Ethnic Nation,’ Korea between empires, 1895-1919, Colombia University Press, New York, pp. 173-174

[3] Em, Henry H. (1999), ‘“Minjok” as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography,’ in Shin, Gi-wook; Robinson, Michael (eds.), Colonial Modernity in Korea, Cambridge: Harvard University Asian Center, pp. 337-338

[4] Schmid (2002) p. 174

[5] Schmid (2002) p. 175

[6] Em, Henry H. (2013) ‘Nationalizing Korea’s Past’ in The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea, Duke University Press, London and Durham, p. 80

[7] Em (2013) p. 77

[8] Robinson, Michael (1984) ‘National Identity and the Thought of Sin Chae’ho: Sadaejuui and Chuch’e in History and Politics,’ The Journal of Korean Studies, Duke University Press, Vol. 5, p. 122

[9] Schmid (2002) p. 182

[10] Em (2013) p. 97

[11] Em (2013) p. 84

[12] Em (2013) p. 100

[13] Em (2013) p. 78

[14] Em (2013) p. 83

[15] Schmid (2002) p. 198

Themes of hero in ‘The Romance Of The Three Kingdoms’

Popular readings of The Romance Of The Three Kingdoms are a key example of the historical novel being interpreted as the historical truth. Often described as part-historical, part-fiction, part-legend, the book situates itself at the centre of the debate over how much historians can truly learn from novels written in the past, about the past. While The Three Kingdoms can definitely tell us about the ideals valued at the time it was published/made popular, the extent which it can be considered historically accurate is questionable.

In particular, the style of writing of the ‘heroes’ in the novel, especially of Guan Yu, is clearly emphasised for literary purposes. Chinese men consistently view the three protagonists, Lui Bei, Guan Yu, and Zhang Fei as models of masculine behaviour [1]. Yet, the patterns of masculine behaviour taken from these emphasised ‘hero’ characters have not remained fixed but rather differ depending on the time of reading, and the qualities seen to be associated with each character have changed over time. For example, contemporary popular opinion of Guan Yu was very positive at the time of writing, and so descriptions of him as a hero were emphasised to fit this.

C. T. Hsia analyses Luo’s use of literary techniques in his writing of heroes. He identifies a key flaw in Guan Yu’s heroism: namely, his arrogance. Hsia asserts that this was a purposeful literary technique in order to bring together the historical descriptions and the mythic qualities of the character and provides an emotional attachment to an otherwise unemotional historical text.

“The arrogance and simple-mindedness are essential to Lo’s concept of a hero cursed with the tragic disease of hubris; without this flaw, a storybook hero of divine prowess would have been insufferable.” [2]

Following the deaths of the two characters Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, Liu Bei is turned into a tragic hero seeking vengeance. Hsia describes the actions that follow in the novel as “Lui Bei the man” standing in the way of “Lui Bei the politician-idealist.” [4] Furthermore, the relationship between Lui Bei and his minister shortly before his death is painted as “friendship fortified by a common ideal,” and Hsia argues that in combining both political and emotional undertones in Lui Bei’s final scene, it turns him into a character of “historical credibility.” [5].

Hsia further comments how most protagonists in the novel are seeking fame, but a number of marginal characters exist to ridicule the protagonists for this. Hsia suggests that in examining official histories during writing, Luo felt “duty-bound” to include all notable men mentioned [2]. However, Hsia is enthusiastic to emphasise the historical accuracy of the novel, naming it “popular literature with a difference” [3]. He compares Luo Guanzhong to Sima Qian in his scholarly efforts and continuation of historical tradition, and praises Luo Guanzhong for achieving an “impersonal objectivity” in his writing [3]. Hsia’s analysis of the novel is purely literary, however, emphasising the novel as a novel of ‘human nature’ whilst claiming its historical validity. Furthermore, his focus solely on themes of hero and lack of commentary on the female characters in the novel, who teach striking lessons in their own right, reveals his analysis as shallow and too focused on the aspects of masculinity found in the novel.

[1] Besio, Kimberly, ‘Zhuge Ling and Zhang Fei: Bowang shao tun and Competing Masculine Ideals in the Development of the Three Kingdoms Story Cycle’, in Besio, Kimberly Ann, and Constantine Tung, eds. Three Kingdoms and Chinese Culture, State University of New York Press (2007) p. 73

[2] Hsia, C. T., ‘The Romance of the Three Kingdoms’ in The Classic Chinese Novel: A Critical Introduction, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong (2015) p. 46

[3] Hsia, (2015) p. 37

[4] Hsia, (2015) p. 55

[5] Hsia (2015) p. 58

A Comparison of Depictions of the Imperial Chinese Worldview: Ge and Wang

Both Zhaoguang Ge and Edward Wang discuss in their respective articles the development of the Chinese worldview throughout the imperial period. They both follow how China sees itself geographically and ethnically within Asia, and within the wider international system, as represented through historical writings from the pre-Qin era (pre-221 B.C.E.) to the Qing dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.).

Ge comments that the first stage of developing a Chinese ‘worldview’ in its traditional historiography takes place during the Han dynasty (206-220 B.C.E.). During this time, Sima Qian and the Shiji had great influence, but Ge argues almost all Han historians “failed to transcend their own ethnocentrism” (2020: 3), and perceptions of the world remained China-centred. Similarly to Ge, Wang highlights the China-focused, hierarchical early Chinese worldview that judged external peoples along their own moral and social lines (1999: 287). However, Wang further reveals that the relationship between the Han and non-Han peoples was complex; the efforts and input of both came together to form the Chinese worldview as it changed over time (1999: 289).

Ge argues that there were several opportunities throughout the history of China’s historiographical development for the acceptance of a wider ranging worldview. He claims it did not achieve this until the introduction of a global perspective in educational history textbooks in the late 19th century/early 20th century. Wang notes that in tracking developments in Chinese history and in demarcating this from the rest of the world, we often incorrectly assume that its present inhabitants are a “fixed entity” (1999: 286). Thus, he notes that in referring to the ‘Chinese’ or ‘Han’ people as an ethnic definition, we must refer to the flux of peoples who inhabited the areas surrounding the Yellow and Yangzi Rivers, and to its self-determining historical past (Wang 1999: 286-7). As opposed to Ge, who focuses China’s philosophical globalisation as occurring during the Qing dynasty, Wang emphasises the achievements of earlier dynasties, such as the Tang (618-907 A.D.) and the Mongol-Yuan (1279-1368 A.D.) dynasties.

In particular, Wang emphasises how the Tang dynasty was known in history for its “openness and flexibility in regard to the other,” and how this was due to its comprehensive culture that was able to encompass almost all ethnicities associated with the dynasty at the time (1999: 299). The Tang’s cosmopolitanism, for Wang, paved the way for a new global Chinese perspective. However, this was lost and replaced by traditional Han and non-Han dichotomies during the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) due to the rise of non-Han powers in the north that challenged the Song’s culturalist approach (p. 300-301). Alternatively, according to Ge the first major transformation in Chinese global knowledge occurred during the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) as a result of the introduction of Buddhism in the medieval period. This helped to develop the idea of territories outside of China consisting of ‘interior’ (close neighbours, named barbarian states) and ‘exterior’ (legitimate foreign powers). Ge argues that China began to think of itself as “among equals” internationally, making distinctions between the self and the other, distinguishing foreign states from barbarian states (2020: 6). Wang corroborates with Ge on this second point, suggesting a multistate worldview existed during the Song dynasty that represented Chinese identity as culturally, rather than ethnically, defined (1999: 302).

Ge emphasizes how the Mongol-Yuan dynasty (1279-1368 B.C.E.) facilitated a continuation of Song ideas and an introduction of a “quasi-global perspective,” but argues that they still placed the people that made up the Han and Tang empires as the central principle of how they observed the world (2020: 7-8). Wang alternatively states that during the Yuan dynasty, the Han ethnic people were “placed at the bottom of its social stratum,” which led to greater differentiation between the self and the other during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) (1999: 303).

However, it is interesting to note that Wang also highlights how – because of the way in which official dynastic histories were recorded, whereby the present empire is required to complete the histories of the previous one – the Ming needed to place themselves as legitimate successors of the Yuan. In doing this, they had to confirm that non-Han peoples could indeed influence the historical development of culture in China. Thus, the outer-periphery model of the Song was adapted to occur by “realpolitik arrangement,” rather than along ethnic lines (Wang 1999: 303).

Although Wang only touches on the developments of worldviews during the Qing period (1644-1911 A.D.) at the end of his article – arguing that the Qing defined China along its physical boundary established through military conquest (1999: 304) – Ge takes the Qing as the centre point of his article. Ge argues that the influence of Western powers and diplomatic pressures on China from outside colonial forces (Britain, Russia, etc.) indicated the need for an intrinsic change in how China thought of itself within the international system. Additionally, translation and publications of several Western written texts within China contributed to this change, as well as Chinese writers’ travelling experiences of foreign countries. China’s domestic and foreign policy came under pressure late in the Qing era, forcing a change in traditional ways of thinking about time and space. How China geographically fitted into this narrative altered its historical conceptions of the wider world (Ge 2020: 9-11).

Thus, although examining the imperial period using the same chronological markers, Ge and Wang’s articles differ in their discussion and opinion of each dynasty, and how the histories of these dynasties intersected with one another. Ge’s article focuses on the Qing dynasty as a final indicator of a globalised Chinese worldview, but only addresses this in his final few pages. Wang, however, explores the changes in this worldview much more theoretically, taking into consideration changes in spatial perceptions, as well as those of the Chinese ethnic identity as a whole.

Works cited:

Ge, Zhaoguang, ‘The Evolution of a World Consciousness in Traditional Chinese Historiography,’ Global Intellectual History, (16th March 2020): 1-19

Wang, Edward, ‘History, Space, and Ethnicity: The Chinese Worldview,’ Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1999): 285-305

The Odes: How folk songs and high society intersect in the Guó Fēng

The Odes (Shi) are one of the Five Confucian Classics. The title, “Shi”, roughly translated to “poems”, “odes”, or “songs”, and they are also known as the ‘Classic of Poetry’. They are performance texts, composed by unknown individuals and compiled as anthologies. Highly rhetorical accounts of the past, they are thought to represent a cultural legacy and a guide to the distant past by Imperial Chinese elites.

As an anthology, the Odes are split into three rhythmical sections: the “Court Songs” (Ya), the “Hymns” (Song) and the “Airs of the States” (Guó Fēng). The 40 Hymns (Song) were often performed alongside dances and plays to commemorate the Shang, Zhou and Lu ruling dynastic houses, and they formed a key part of state sacrifices despite having no formal rhyme scheme. The Court Songs (Ya), numbering 105 pieces, can further be separated into two categories: major and minor. Used for official state events and entertainment, they conveyed political messages through their musical patterns; “The tones from a time of good rule are peaceful and happy, as the government is balanced. The tones from a time of chaos are resentful and angry, as the government is unbalanced.” (Nylan 2001:81). The most commonly used, and most significant in number with 160 different poems, was the Airs of the States (Guó Fēng). These short, single-themed songs concerned daily life, love, and war, and are structured in brief stanzas with an occasional line-by-line rhyme scheme. The Guó Fēng verses of the Odes anthology found its origins in localised and regional folk songs of the various territorial states of Zhou, and were compiled through mass governmental collection.

It is within the fascinating evolution of the Guó Fēngthat these short, single-themed folk songs concerning daily life developed into extended metaphorical vehicles for expressing emotion and intent in situations of diplomacy and high society. They are said to have been collected by officers dispatched by the Zhou Dynasty court to allow the king to observe the state of the common people. For the Zhou, whose ideological governance style was rooted in the benign nature of their rulers, the conditions of the common people were of great importance in indicating successful rule. As such, the Guó Fēng was compiled and performed for royal audiences to allow them to assert their benevolence.

Despite this, they were very commonly known due to their folk origins, serving a dual purpose of contributing towards common discourse and being expressionistic of high culture. For the elites, they represented a cultural legacy and guide to the distant past. They operated as a didactic instrument, preserving cultural lessons and teachings held only previously in memory – using continuous metaphorical imagery to do so. By the imperial period, the Odes were taught from a young age: an “early thesaurus and book of etiquette rolled into one…” (Nylan 2001:92). Publicly, they functioned as graceful and indirect vehicles for expressing emotion and intent in diplomatic settings, allowing one to address delicate matters subtly, within accepted customs and without embarrassment.

For the non-elites, the Odes placed a strong emphasis on friendship and humans as social beings, operating as a means to integrate oneself within a larger social phenomenon. They facilitated singing in harmony and contributed towards a sense of community. Both performers and listeners – through their interpretations – participated in endowing each Ode with meaning alongside that intended by the original composer.

The evolution of the anthology from its early textual history into what we see now is not cohesively documented, although the fairly consistent voice throughout suggests at least one unified final reworking of the collection. The notion of an original text attached to a single time/place/situation/author is misleading. Rather, conscious repetition and their malleable nature gave the performance texts cultural influence and allowed for elites and royal audiences to renovate individual Odes and endow them with expressions of high culture.

Works cited:

Nylan, Michael, ‘Chapter 2: The Odes,’ The Five “Confucian” Classics (2001)