Tag: history

The Positivist Historian’s Dilemma in Post-Liberation Korea

The Korean peninsula was ‘liberated’ following the defeat of Japan at the end of the Second World War. Military occupation and the division of occupied territory between the USA and Soviet Union was originally only put in place to secure the transition of Korea into a peninsula controlled by an international administration. The complex politics of the Cold War prevented this [1].

The developments of post-liberation politics were complicated by various political alliances and domestic issues, and so an American-backed colonial elite came back into power in the South. There was no clear break in political structure in the South in the pre- and post-liberation periods, so the “legacy of collaboration” remained a political issue [1]. Ceuster states that public opinion maintained that, “in order to secure a future for an independent Korean state, former collaborators had to be excluded from an active role in post-war politics.” [1]. However, no comprehensive attempt was made at defining who was actually a collaborator. Many Korean administration workers for the Japanese colonial government general remained in high positions by painting themselves as “crusaders against the communist threat.” [1]. Moreover, historical discourse on collaboration became complicated when political convictions interfered and steered historical research.

For positivist historians, who emphasised the objectivity of empirical research in history writing, the idea of having to apologise for their role during colonial occupation was problematic. The concept of writing a positivist history rested on the notion that the facts told the story, and that the story was inherently embedded in themselves as fact. No historian who submitted to rigorous research of the facts could produce an alternative narrative that was not already present in the historical sources themselves [2]. As long as a historian conformed to this scientific, empirical method, then the histories they wrote were ultimately objective.

Considering this, what then would positivist historians in Korea have to apologise for post-liberation? [2]. If they acknowledged their role in furthering Japanese historical narratives, such as toyoshi, then they would be admitting that their positivist histories were not as objective as they claimed. The idea of disavowing their previous work and engaging in a systematic critique of their positive historiographies, and the narrative strategies immanent within them, was not popular. This kind of critique would come later in South Korea, starting in 1961 and developing into historiographies on cultural history [2].

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[1] Ceuster, Koen de, (2001) ‘The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea,’ Korean Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2. pp. 207-242

[2] Em, Henry H. (2013) The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea, Duke University Press, London and Durham

A Comparison of Depictions of the Imperial Chinese Worldview: Ge and Wang

Both Zhaoguang Ge and Edward Wang discuss in their respective articles the development of the Chinese worldview throughout the imperial period. They both follow how China sees itself geographically and ethnically within Asia, and within the wider international system, as represented through historical writings from the pre-Qin era (pre-221 B.C.E.) to the Qing dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.).

Ge comments that the first stage of developing a Chinese ‘worldview’ in its traditional historiography takes place during the Han dynasty (206-220 B.C.E.). During this time, Sima Qian and the Shiji had great influence, but Ge argues almost all Han historians “failed to transcend their own ethnocentrism” (2020: 3), and perceptions of the world remained China-centred. Similarly to Ge, Wang highlights the China-focused, hierarchical early Chinese worldview that judged external peoples along their own moral and social lines (1999: 287). However, Wang further reveals that the relationship between the Han and non-Han peoples was complex; the efforts and input of both came together to form the Chinese worldview as it changed over time (1999: 289).

Ge argues that there were several opportunities throughout the history of China’s historiographical development for the acceptance of a wider ranging worldview. He claims it did not achieve this until the introduction of a global perspective in educational history textbooks in the late 19th century/early 20th century. Wang notes that in tracking developments in Chinese history and in demarcating this from the rest of the world, we often incorrectly assume that its present inhabitants are a “fixed entity” (1999: 286). Thus, he notes that in referring to the ‘Chinese’ or ‘Han’ people as an ethnic definition, we must refer to the flux of peoples who inhabited the areas surrounding the Yellow and Yangzi Rivers, and to its self-determining historical past (Wang 1999: 286-7). As opposed to Ge, who focuses China’s philosophical globalisation as occurring during the Qing dynasty, Wang emphasises the achievements of earlier dynasties, such as the Tang (618-907 A.D.) and the Mongol-Yuan (1279-1368 A.D.) dynasties.

In particular, Wang emphasises how the Tang dynasty was known in history for its “openness and flexibility in regard to the other,” and how this was due to its comprehensive culture that was able to encompass almost all ethnicities associated with the dynasty at the time (1999: 299). The Tang’s cosmopolitanism, for Wang, paved the way for a new global Chinese perspective. However, this was lost and replaced by traditional Han and non-Han dichotomies during the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) due to the rise of non-Han powers in the north that challenged the Song’s culturalist approach (p. 300-301). Alternatively, according to Ge the first major transformation in Chinese global knowledge occurred during the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) as a result of the introduction of Buddhism in the medieval period. This helped to develop the idea of territories outside of China consisting of ‘interior’ (close neighbours, named barbarian states) and ‘exterior’ (legitimate foreign powers). Ge argues that China began to think of itself as “among equals” internationally, making distinctions between the self and the other, distinguishing foreign states from barbarian states (2020: 6). Wang corroborates with Ge on this second point, suggesting a multistate worldview existed during the Song dynasty that represented Chinese identity as culturally, rather than ethnically, defined (1999: 302).

Ge emphasizes how the Mongol-Yuan dynasty (1279-1368 B.C.E.) facilitated a continuation of Song ideas and an introduction of a “quasi-global perspective,” but argues that they still placed the people that made up the Han and Tang empires as the central principle of how they observed the world (2020: 7-8). Wang alternatively states that during the Yuan dynasty, the Han ethnic people were “placed at the bottom of its social stratum,” which led to greater differentiation between the self and the other during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) (1999: 303).

However, it is interesting to note that Wang also highlights how – because of the way in which official dynastic histories were recorded, whereby the present empire is required to complete the histories of the previous one – the Ming needed to place themselves as legitimate successors of the Yuan. In doing this, they had to confirm that non-Han peoples could indeed influence the historical development of culture in China. Thus, the outer-periphery model of the Song was adapted to occur by “realpolitik arrangement,” rather than along ethnic lines (Wang 1999: 303).

Although Wang only touches on the developments of worldviews during the Qing period (1644-1911 A.D.) at the end of his article – arguing that the Qing defined China along its physical boundary established through military conquest (1999: 304) – Ge takes the Qing as the centre point of his article. Ge argues that the influence of Western powers and diplomatic pressures on China from outside colonial forces (Britain, Russia, etc.) indicated the need for an intrinsic change in how China thought of itself within the international system. Additionally, translation and publications of several Western written texts within China contributed to this change, as well as Chinese writers’ travelling experiences of foreign countries. China’s domestic and foreign policy came under pressure late in the Qing era, forcing a change in traditional ways of thinking about time and space. How China geographically fitted into this narrative altered its historical conceptions of the wider world (Ge 2020: 9-11).

Thus, although examining the imperial period using the same chronological markers, Ge and Wang’s articles differ in their discussion and opinion of each dynasty, and how the histories of these dynasties intersected with one another. Ge’s article focuses on the Qing dynasty as a final indicator of a globalised Chinese worldview, but only addresses this in his final few pages. Wang, however, explores the changes in this worldview much more theoretically, taking into consideration changes in spatial perceptions, as well as those of the Chinese ethnic identity as a whole.

Works cited:

Ge, Zhaoguang, ‘The Evolution of a World Consciousness in Traditional Chinese Historiography,’ Global Intellectual History, (16th March 2020): 1-19

Wang, Edward, ‘History, Space, and Ethnicity: The Chinese Worldview,’ Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1999): 285-305